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ABSTRACT
Transferability of adversarial examples is a key issue to study
the security of multimedia forensics (MMF) techniques relying on
Deep Learning (DL). The transferability of the attacks, in fact,
would open the way to the deployment of successful counter
forensics attacks also in cases where the attacker does not have
a full knowledge of the to-be-attacked system. Some preliminary
works have shown that adversarial examples against CNN-based
image forensics detectors are in general non-transferrable, at least
when the basic versions of the attacks implemented in the most
popular attack packages are adopted. In this paper, we introduce
a general strategy to increase the strength of the attacks and
evaluate the transferability of the adversarial examples when such
a strength varies. We experimentally show that, in this way, attack
transferability can be improved to a large extent, at the expense
of a larger distortion. Our research confirms the security threats
posed by the existence of adversarial examples even in multimedia
forensics scenarios, thus calling for new defense strategies to
improve the security of DL-based MMF techniques.
Index Terms— Adversarial multimedia forensics, deep learning
for forensics, security of deep learning, transferability of adversarial
attacks, image manipulation detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several researches in machine learning have shown that adver-
sarial attacks carried out against a given network (in most cases,
but not only, a convolutional neural network - CNN) are often
transferable to other networks designed for the same task, that
is, the attacks maintain part of their effectiveness even against
networks other than the one considered for the construction of the
attack [1], [2]. Attack transferability is a key property, especially in
security-related scenarios like multimedia forensics, since it opens
the way towards powerful attacks that can be used in real-life
applications, wherein the attacker does not have full access to the
attacked network (gray-box scenario). Thanks to transferability, in
fact, the attacker can attack a surrogate network mimicking the
target one and the attack will be effective against the target network
with large probability [1], [3].
While attack transferability was first proved for computer vision
applications, recent research has shown that common adversarial
examples are often non-transferable in image forensic applications
[4]–[6], thus calling for new research on this topic. In particular,
it is important to evaluate the transferability of the attacks under
conditions that deviate from the standard implementations of the
attacks provided by the most popular attack software packages
[7], [8]. Such implementations, in fact, are usually designed in
such a way to minimize the embedding distortion for a successful
attack. In this way, the attacked samples are often very close to the
detection boundary, so that even a slight modification of the detector
may undermine the effectiveness of the attack. On the contrary,
the attacker may allow a larger distortion, if doing so permits to
obtain an attacked sample that lies deeper into the target region of
the attack (since in this way the probability that the attack can be
transferred to another network increases). Unfortunately, controlling
the distance of the attacked samples to the decision boundary, and
hence controlling their resilience to perturbations of the boundary
is not easy, given the complexity of the decision boundary learnt
by CNNs.
In this paper, we introduce a general strategy to increase the
strength of the attacks and use such a strategy to evaluate the
transferability of the adversarial examples in a multimedia forensics
context, when such a strength varies. Specifically, we can get
stronger attacks by increasing the confidence of the misclassifi-
cation, namely the difference between the score (logits) of the
target class of the attack and the score of the highest-scored class
among the other classes. Our experiments reveal that controlling the
strength of the attack by varying its confidence level is an effective
way to improve the transferability of the attack, at the expense of
a larger distortion introduced by the attack.
II. CONFIDENCE-CONTROLLED ATTACKS
The most straightforward way of controlling the strength of
attacks (at least those based on gradient descent) would be to go
on with the attack iterations until a limit value of the PSNR (Peak
Signal to Noise Ratio) is reached. The PSNR, then, would give a
measure of the attack strength. Some preliminary experiments we
have carried out, however, reveal that controlling the strength of
the attack in this way is not easy. One reason for such a difficulty
is the intricacy of the detection boundary, so that a lower PSNR
does not necessarily result in a stronger attack. In addition, if the
gradient is computed directly at the output of the network (e.g.
by referring to the entropy loss), as soon as we depart from the
detection boundary the gradient assumes extremely small values,
and so following the gradient moves the attacked samples in a
direction that does not necessarily result in a greater distance from
the boundary. To cope with the above difficulties, we have devised a
solution that modifies the stop condition of the attack in such a way
to control the confidence of the misclassification induced by the
attack. In this way, the solver of the optimization problem the attack
relies on is forced to find an adversarial sample that is classified as
the target class with the desired minimum confidence. Otherwise, a
failure is declared (no adversarial samples can be returned with the
desired confidence). In the following, we describe the confidence-
based attack by focusing on the case of binary classification1. Let φ
be the function describing the output of the neural network and let y
denotes the class label, y = 0, 1. Let zi be the logits, i.e. the outputs
of the neural network prior to the softmax layer, corresponding to
the two labels i = 0, 1. The final value φ is obtained by applying the
softmax to the logits and thresholding the output. Given an image
X such that y = i (i = 0, 1), an image X ′ is declared adversarial if
only if z1−i−zi > c, where c > 0 is the desired confidence. All the
most popular adversarial attack algorithms (e.g. FGSM, PGD . . . )
can be modified by generalizing the stop condition in this way. The
goal of our research is to evaluate the transferability of adversarial
attacks against multimedia forensics detectors, as a function of the
confidence margin c.
III. METHODOLOGY
In order to carry out a comprehensive investigation, we assessed
the attack transferability under various sources and degrees of
mismatch between the source network, i.e., the network used to
create the adversarial attack (SN), and the target network, i.e.,
the one the attack should be transferred to (TN). In particular, we
considered the following types of transferability: i) cross-network
(different network architectures trained on the same dataset), ii)
cross-training (the same architecture trained on different datasets)
and iii) cross-network-and-training (different architectures trained
on different datasets). We carried out our experiments with different
kinds of attacks, considering two manipulation detection tasks (me-
dian filtering and image resizing) and three different architectures,
as described below.
III-A. Attacks
We created the adversarial examples by applying the confidence-
based stop condition to the following methods: i) Iterative Fast
Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM) [9], i.e. the refined iterative
version of the original FGSM attack, ii) the Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) attack [10], [11], iii) C&W attack [12], and iv)
Momentum Iterative FGSM (MI-FGSM) [13].
A brief description of the basic version of the above attacks
is provided in the following. With I-FGSM, at each iteration, an
adversarial perturbation is obtained by computing the gradient of
the loss function with respect to the input image and considering its
sign multiplied by a (normalized) strength factor ε. The algorithm
is applied iteratively until an adversarial image is obtained (that is,
an image which is misclassified by the network), for a maximum
number of steps. PGD is about finding the perturbation that
maximizes the loss function under some restrictions regarding the
introduced L∞ distortion. Specifically, at each iteration, first the
image is updated (similarly to I-FGSM) based on some ε; then,
the pixel values are clipped to ensure that they remain in the α-
neighbourhood of the original image. The C&W attack based on
the L2 metric minimizes a loss function that weighs a classification
loss with a distance term measuring the distortion between the
original and the attacked images, after applying a tanh-nonlinearity
to enforce the attacked samples to take values in a limited bounding
box. Finally, MI-FGSM uses the momentum method to stabilize
the update directions. It works by adding the current gradient to
the accumulated gradients from the previous steps. In this way, the
optimization should escape from poor local maxima/minima during
1While trivial, the extension to multi-class classification requires us to
distinguish between targeted and non-targeted attacks.
the iterations (in principle, the momentum iterative method can be
easily applied to any iterative attack algorithms. By following [13],
we considered I-FGSM).
Some observations are in order. C&W method already intro-
duces a confidence parameter, named κ, in its formulation of the
objective function, so that the solver is ‘encouraged’ to find an
adversarial instance that belongs to the desired class with high
confidence (lower value of the objective function). However, by
running the attack with a standard implementation, it turns out that
the confidence achieved by the attacked images is not always κ
(depending on the number of iterations considered for the attack and
other parameters [12]). Then, we applied our confidence-based stop
condition to this attack as well, to ensure that the desired confidence
is always achieved (with c = κ). Another observation regards MI-
FGSM. Integrating the momentum term into the iterative process
is something that should by itself increase the transferability of
the adversarial examples [13]. Then, in this case, by considering
c > 0, we are basically combining together two ways to get a
stronger attack. However, according to our results, the improvement
of transferability that can be obtained by using the momentum is a
minor one, thus justifying the further adoption of our confidence-
based strategy.
III-B. Datasets and Networks
For the experiments with training mismatch, we considered the
RAISE (R) [14] and the VISION (V) datasets [15]. In particular,
about 2000 uncompressed, camera-native images (.tiff) were taken
from the RAISE dataset, with size of 4288 × 2848. The same
number of images were taken from the VISION dataset. To get
similar resolution images for the two datasets, we selected only the
devices for which the resolution was not very different from that of
RAISE images. The images from both R and V datasets were split
into training (and validation) set and test set, and then processed to
get the images of the manipulated class, namely, median-filtered
and resized images. For all our tests we considered gray-level
images, then all the RGB images were converted to gray-scale.
We considered two different detection tasks, namely the detection
of median filtering (by a 5 × 5 window) and image resizing
(downsampling, by a factor of 0.8). Concerning the network ar-
chitectures used to build the detectors, we considered the network
in [16] from Bayar and Stamm (BSnet), and the one in [17]
from Barni and Costanzo et al. (BC+net). BSnet was originally
proposed for standard manipulation detection tasks and it is not
very deep (3 convolutional layers, 3 max-pooling layers, and 2
fully connected layers). As a main feature of BSnet, the filters of
the first layer (with 5 × 5 receptive field) are forced to have a
high-pass nature, so to extract residual-based features. We refer to
[16] for more details. BC+net was initially proposed for the more
difficult task of generic contrast adjustment detection. Compared to
BSnet, it is much deeper (9 convolutional layers) and no constraint
is applied to the first layer. Again, we refer to the original paper
[17] for more details. We also considered a common network for
pattern recognition, that is, the VGG-16 network (VGGnet) [18].
The architecture considered consists of 13 convolutional layers in
total, and, respectively, 1024, 256, and 2 (output) neurons for the
three fully connected layers (see [18]). For a given detection task,
we indicate the trained model as φDBNet, where “Net” indicates the
architecture with “Net” ∈ {BSnet, BC+net,VGGnet}, and “DB”
∈ {R, V} the dataset used for training.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
IV-A. Setup
Based on the three different CNN architectures described above,
we trained the models for the detection tasks in the following way.
To build the BSnet models corresponding to the two detection
tasks, we considered 2 × 105 patches per class for training (and
validation) and 104 for testing. To get the VGGnet models, we
used 105 patches per class for training and 104 for validation
and testing. A maximum number of 100 patches was (randomly)
selected from each image to increase patch diversity by using more
images. Finally, for the BC+net’s, we considered 106 patches for
training, 105 patches for validation and 5×104 patches for testing.
To reach these numbers, we selected all the patches from each
image. For all the networks, the patch size was set to 128 × 128.
The batch size for training was set to 32 patches. For BSnet and
BC+net, the Adam solver with learning rate 10−4 and momentum
0.99 was used. The learning rate was set to 10−5 for VGGnet. The
number of epochs was set, respectively, to 30 for BSnet [16], 50
for VGGnet, and 3 for BC+net (following [17]). The accuracies
achieved by the various models on the test sets range between
98.1% and 99.5% for the median detection task, and from 96.6%
to 99% for the resizing detection.
We attacked images from the manipulated class only. In counter-
forensic applications, in fact, it is reasonable to assume that the
attack is only in one direction, since the attacker wants to pass off a
manipulated image as an original one, i.e. he aims at causing a false
negative error. Performance are measured on 500 attacked images,
obtained by attacking a subset of manipulated images among those
in the test set. The Foolbox toolbox [7] was used to implement
the attacks. The parameters of the attacks were set as follows2.
For C&W, all the parameters were set to the default values. For
PGD, we set ‘epsilon’ = 0.5 and ‘stepsize’ = 0.05. The only
exceptions are the attacks against φBC+net, for which we considered
smaller ‘stepsize’ (=0.002) and ‘epsilon’ (= 0.02) to achieve higher
attack success rate. A binary search is performed over ‘epsilon’
and ‘stepsize’ to optimize the choice of the hyperparameters, using
the input values only for the initialization of the algorithm. For
I-FGSM, we set ‘max epsilon’ = 1 and ‘epsilons’ = 100, and the
maximum number of steps is 10 (default). Several values of ε were
considered given the input setting, the value which minimizes the
distortion of the final attacked image with respect to the original
one is eventually selected. For MI-FGSM, the multiplier for the
gradient updating term was set to µ = 0.2 (similar results were
obtained with lower values of µ).
Several mismatch combinations of SN and TN were considered
for both detection tasks, for the cases of cross-network, cross-
training and cross-network-and-training. For sake of simplicity, we
will only report the results for a subset of the cases, which is
sufficient to draw the most significant conclusions.
IV-B. Results
Tables I and II show the results for the case of cross-network
transferability for two different combinations of SN and TN, that
is, (SN,TN) = (φRVGGnet, φ
R
BSnet) and (SN,TN) = (φ
R
BSnet, φ
R
BC+net),
for the median and resizing detection tasks, respectively. For each
2For lack of space, for each attack, we report only the values of the
foolbox input parameters. For their meaning and their relation with the
parameters of the attack, we refer to [7].
attack method, we report the attack success rate with respect to
the source network, ASRSN, and to the target network, ASRTN, and
the PSNR of the attacked images, averaged on the successfully
attacked samples, for several confidence values c ranging from
0 to a maximum value chosen in such a way that the PSNR of
the attacked image is not too low (around 30 dB). The range
of values for c depends on the magnitude of the logits and then
depends on the SN. The ASRSN is 100%, or close to this value. By
inspecting the tables, we see that by controlling the confidence, the
transferability of the attacks can be significantly improved in all the
cases, and the ASRTN passes from [0-27]% with c = 0 to [80-97]%
with the maximum reported c for median, and from [0-1]% with
c = 0 to [40-90]% with the maximum reported c for resizing. In all
cases, the PSNR of the attacked images remains pretty high (larger
than 40dB for the case of median detection, and about 30dB for
the case of resizing). There are some combinations of (SN,TN), not
reported here due to space limitation, for which the transferability
does not increase much by increasing c, e.g. when SN = φRBC+net
for the resizing detection task, in which case ASRTN can only be
increased from [0-2]% up to at most 20%. This happens when the
gradient is almost vanishing, in which case the attacked samples
are moved in a direction far from the boundary, where increasing
the confidence may not help in increasing the transferability with
respect to the target network.
Noticeably, increasing the confidence c permits to increase the
transferability also in the MI-FGSM attack, where we did not verify
any significant transferability improvement for the c = 0 case, with
respect to I-FGSM. A possible explanation is that the strength of
the perturbation applied at each iteration of the I-FGSM attack
is very small, then the gradients between subsequent iterations are
highly correlated, thus reducing the impact of gradient stabilization
sought by MI-FGSM. However, as already pointed out in previous
works [6], [19], if we increase the strength of the perturbation
applied at each iteration, the ASR with respect to the SN decreases
significantly in many cases. We also observe that the degree of
transferability depends on the dataset and the SN architecture, as
it was already noticed in [6]. However, in most cases, the attacks
can be successfully transferred by increasing the confidence, and
the image quality can be preserved at the same time. To better
investigate the effect of the confidence margin on the attack, in
Table III, we report the number of iterations for the I-FGSM, for
different confidence values c. The table refers to the case of attacks
carried out against φRBSnet, trained for the resizing detection task.
As expected, we see that by increasing c the attack requires more
iterations. A similar behavior can be observed in the other cases.
The results for the cross-training case, when (SN,TN) =
(φRBSnet, φ
V
BSnet) and (SN,TN) = (φ
R
VGGnet, φ
V
VGGnet), are reported in
Tables IV and V for the median and resizing detection tasks,
respectively. These results are in line with the previous ones and
show that increasing the confidence always helps to raise ASRTN of
a percentage from 35% to more than 90%, depending on the case.
We also observe that, as with the cross-network case, transferring
the attacks between networks trained for resizing detection tend to
be more difficult, with respect to the case of median detection. In
Table V (upper rows), we see that increasing c above a certain
quantity, the ASRTN starts to decrease. This is possibly due to
the fact that when the attacked samples are too distant from the
boundary, they may enter in ‘unpopulated’ regions of the feature
space (with few or no training samples), where the behavior of
Table I. Results for cross-network for the median detection task.
SN = φRVGGnet, TN = φ
R
BSnet
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 8.4 69.1 100 5.4 67.3 100 27.2 58.1 100 27.2 58.1
12 97 47.4 54.9 100 60.8 50.6 100 71.6 47.8 100 72.0 47.7
12.5 97 68.4 52.0 100 85.4 45.8 100 89.4 44.4 100 88.8 45.1
13 97 87.6 48.5 100 96.4 41.2 100 97.2 40.1 100 97.0 41.0
SN = φR
BSnet
, TN = φR
BC+net
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 0.2 72.0 100 0.2 74.5 100 23.2 59.7 100 23.4 59.7
50 100 56.0 52.2 100 55.2 50.2 100 60.0 48.9 100 60.0 48.8
80 100 74.0 47.8 100 73.6 45.7 100 77.8 45.0 100 79.0 44.8
100 100 83.6 45.2 100 84.4 43.3 100 87.6 42.8 100 87.4 42.6
Table II. Results for cross-network for the resizing detection task.
SN = φRVGGnet, TN = φ
R
BSnet
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 1.2 71.5 100 1.2 75.0 100 0.2 59.3 100 0.2 59.2
17 100 40.4 36.8 100 28.0 29.9 100 30.6 29.5 100 30.0 30.6
17.5 99.8 47.3 35.5 100 33.4 28.7 100 37.6 28.3 100 37.2 29.4
18 99.6 53.6 34.3 100 43.2 27.6 100 49.4 27.2 100 42.8 28.3
SN = φR
BSnet
, TN = φR
BC+net
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 0.4 68.3 100 0.4 66.9 100 0.4 58.7 100 0.4 58.6
50 100 82.4 45.9 100 65.4 42.1 100 65.6 41.6 100 65.8 41.8
80 100 85.2 39.3 100 84.8 35.1 100 84.2 34.7 100 87.8 35.4
100 100 80.4 34.0 100 86.0 30.6 100 87.2 30.1 100 87.8 30.9
different models can be very different.
Eventually, Table VI shows the results for the case of cross-
network-and-training for the median and resizing detection tasks
when (SN,TN) = (φVBSnet, φ
R
BC+net). Due to lack of space, only the
cases corresponding to c = 0 and the largest c are reported. For the
first case, a significant gain in the transferability of the attacks is
achieved by raising c (at the price of some decrease in the ASRSN),
while in the second case the gain is less than 20%.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Aiming at verifying some previous results showing a certain lack
of transferability of adversarial attacks against CNN-based image
forensic detectors, we introduced a general strategy to control the
strength of the attacks based on the margin (here referred to as
confidence) between the logit value of the target class and those
of the other classes. Based on the experiments we have carried
out, we can conclude that, as opposed to previous findings, by
increasing the confidence margin, the attacks can be successfully
transferred in most of the cases (with ASR > 80%), regardless of
the specific attack algorithm considered, while the PSNR of the
attacked image remains good (> 30dB). In some cases, a slightly
Table III. Distribution (%) of the number of iterations for the I-
FGSM by varying c for the resizing detection task. SN = φRBSnet.
No. it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c = 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c = 50 0.6 71.0 27.6 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
c = 100 0 0 0.8 7.8 41.6 14.8 7.8 14.4 12.8 0
Table IV. Results for cross-training for the median detection task.
SN = φRBSnet, TN = φ
V
BSnet
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 0.2 72.0 100 0.2 74.5 100 4.8 59.7 100 4.8 59.7
50 100 60.0 52.2 100 61.2 50.2 100 65.0 48.9 100 65.4 48.8
80 100 82.0 47.8 100 84.2 45.7 100 88.2 45.0 100 88.2 44.8
100 100 95.0 45.2 100 97.2 43.3 100 97.8 42.8 100 98.2 42.6
SN = φR
VGGnet
, TN = φV
VGGnet
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 0.4 69.1 100 0.4 67.3 100 7.8 58.1 100 7.8 58.1
11 100 31.8 59.2 100 38.2 55.8 100 74.2 52.0 100 76.2 51.7
11.5 100 59.8 57.3 100 72.8 53.6 100 89.0 50.2 100 89.4 50.0
12 97 91.6 54.9 100 94.0 50.6 100 96.6 47.8 100 96.4 47.7
Table V. Results for cross-training for the resizing detection task.
SN = φRBSnet, TN = φ
V
BSnet
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 9.8 68.3 100 9.6 66.9 100 12.8 58.7 100 12.8 58.6
50 100 39.2 45.9 100 66.4 42.1 100 67.2 41.6 100 65.0 41.8
80 100 40.4 39.3 100 55.6 35.1 100 54.6 34.7 100 46.4 35.4
100 100 46.2 34.1 100 53.4 30.6 96.6 55.6 30.1 99.8 38.4 30.9
SN = φR
VGGnet
, TN = φV
VGGnet
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 5.6 71.5 100 5.8 75.0 100 7.6 59.3 100 7.6 59.2
13.5 100 30.0 50.2 100 43.8 45.2 100 58.2 43.9 100 50.8 44.4
14 100 43.6 47.9 100 67.2 42.3 100 79.0 41.2 100 72.6 41.9
14.5 100 65.2 45.7 100 90.6 39.6 100 93.2 38.6 100 92.0 39.5
larger distortion is necessary to get high transfer rates, the degree
of transferability that can be achieved (given a minimum PSNR for
the attack) depending on the detection task and the specific model
targeted by the attack. Future research will focus on the use of
the proposed increased-confidence attack to evaluate the security
of existing defences against adversarial examples, e.g. those based
on randomization strategies [20], [21] or defensive distillation [22],
and also to develop new more powerful defence mechanisms.
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Table VI. Results for cross-network-and-training for the median
(rows 1-2) and resizing (rows 3-4) detection tasks.
SN = φV
BSnet
, TN = φR
BC+net
C&W PGD I-FGSM MI-FGSM
c ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR ASRSN ASRTN PSNR
0 100 0.0 70.5 100 0.0 71.8 100 2.6 60.0 100 2.6 60.0
100 99.2 78.0 45.1 100 84.0 42.8 100 86.0 42.2 100 85.6 42.2
0 100 0.8 73.3 100 0.8 74.4 100 2.0 59.8 100 2.0 59.7
400 89.6 17.0 33.6 86.2 19.5 30.3 88.6 16.3 30.1 90 17.3 30.5
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